The 2015 US Surrogacy Conference was held in San Francisco on September 26. Attendees were greeted by a series of representatives from surrogacy agencies (based in the US, Mexico, and India) who sought to assure them that although surrogacy can be a trying process “not for the faint of heart,” it is often a tremendously rewarding “journey.” Psychologists, lawyers, and physicians similarly celebrated the quest for children via third-party reproduction.
The audience at various panels ranged from about 15 people (mainly for presentations pertaining to international surrogacy) up to 50 for popular presentations such as The Psychology of Surrogacy and Pre-Genetic Testing & Embryo Transfer Decisions. A substantial portion consisted of male couples, and they were the target demographic for most presenters. Both at booths describing services and during presentations, images of happy babies, pregnant bellies, and glowing families were unavoidable. Happy families are, after all, the “happy ending” that surrogacy is designed to attain.
I came to the event not because I was considering hiring a surrogate, but because of a range of questions about commercial surrogacy that I haven’t seen widely considered. Who is served by the “happy ending” that’s so widely advertised, besides parents who want families? The assumption is that babies born from surrogacy arrangements will have loving parents, who expended time, effort, and money on their creation. What about babies who may never know the truth of their origin, or who may experience consequent health risks that are currently unknown and consistently understudied? Surrogates who say they experience great joy after seeing the family they helped to create certainly seem to benefit. But others claim they are taken advantage of and subjected to needless health risks.
These questions were largely sidelined at the US Surrogacy Conference: they linger below the surface-level concerns of family creation. Granted, physicians did stress the health risks of multiple births for surrogate mothers, and agency representatives did try to emphasize the important of building a relationship with one’s surrogate. But those warnings were overpowered by the happy-family imagery, by the reassurance that surrogates are thoroughly screened and selectively chosen, and by instructions on how to choose the right agency for you or construct a comprehensive legal contract. In other words, the ideas and jargon presented at the conference toggled between a narrative of wholesome, joyful family creation on one hand and caution on the other. The “happy family” rhetoric constitutes the surface narrative offered by surrogacy agencies, while the caution reflects the (often submerged) complexity of surrogacy. Which narrative is more accurate?
If surrogacy is indeed an ethically complicated commercial transaction entailing significant risk, then cost is a concern, regulation is needed, and agencies and surveillance are necessary to manage the process. If surrogacy is merely an alternative family-building method free of substantial concern, then cost is not an issue, and third-party reproduction (and PGD, sex selection, and monetarily valuing certain traits over others) can be mediated by personal decisions alone rather than by formal regulation. Critics of surrogacy and third-party reproduction often assert that yes, there is a market, and it needs regulation, while most speakers at the conference ignore the market even though, paradoxically,they themselves constitute key players. What should we make of this?
Debora Spar famously posited that we ignore the “baby business” because we are reluctant to consider babies and commerce in the same breath. In addition, I venture to guess that most representatives of surrogacy agencies would like us to forget that their activities are embedded in that business. Thus, money—a key component of any financial market—becomes an important concern.
Several speakers addressed the price of surrogacy and admitted that it is indeed “a costly adventure.” Among the costs: $4500–5000 for pre-implantation genetic screening, $1000 for blood tests at 10 weeks of gestation, $32,000 for an egg from an Indian donor, $45,000 for an egg from a Caucasian donor, and $20,000 for lawyer’s fees (all US dollars).
In the United States alone, the fertility industry is estimated to generate over $3 billion in revenue each year. But overall the price tags were muted by industry representatives who wanted to showcase their compassionate expert services, not advertise dollar signs that hint at the commodification of bodies and babies. Cost is obviously an issue for many people, including those who came to the 2015 US Surrogacy Conference. But to find such information, attendees would have to mine their brochures.
Further, if caution is necessary due to the risks of surrogacy, there is an accompanying need for regulation. Currently, registered clinics only voluntarily follow Society for Assisted Reproductive Technology guidelines. If they fail to do so, there are no repercussions. There are no federal laws in the United States that specify how much or little egg donors can be paid or that prohibit discrimination against non-heteronormative couples. The United States, in fact, is widely considered the “Wild West” of the global fertility market. This leaves agencies like those represented at the conference to self-regulate; and however altruistic the principals of these businesses (indeed, many have children via some type of third-party reproduction themselves), the bottom line is omnipresent.
Brokers and agencies at once deny the existence of a market in favor of a more family-oriented ethos and embody the existence of the market themselves. Conference speakers routinely warned that agencies are absolutely necessary to navigate the many bureaucratic hoops that define the surrogacy process. Sam Everingham cautioned that if intended parents don’t do their “due diligence” and create trust in the process, they will “get burned.” Steve Snyder claimed that “the cases that go awry are cases that are not well-monitored.”
In other words, if you wish to create your family and avoid risks, hire an agency. Thus, agencies position themselves as shields against an otherwise harsh marketplace that they themselves create and uphold. This apparent contradiction must force us to seriously question the ramifications of the existing baby market.
If, on the other hand, surrogacy is simply an alternative “family-building” mechanism free of substantial ethical risks, several opposite conclusions follow. Third-party reproduction then becomes not about money—cost isn’t an issue!—but about family creation, which is priceless. Dr. Kim Berman of Growing Generations said that surrogacy is a “relationship, not a business transaction.” Victoria Ferrara of The Ferrara Law Group reminded the audience that “we don’t want to think about this as buying a baby.”
She’s right: we don’t. So instead of a business transaction or baby selling, third-party reproduction becomes a “journey” in which surrogates (whom one participant dubbed altruistic “angels”) give families the “ultimate gift”: a child (genetically-related, of course). Money is sidelined in favor of more profound concerns.
In addition to “journey” and “gift-giving” rhetoric, libertarian ideals about individual choice were a pronounced theme. From the idea of personal “choice” family-building flows unfettered personal “choice” in a variety of more particular decisions. You can choose to have pre-implantation genetic screenings, and choose whether or not to terminate the pregnancy based on the results. This is about your family, nothing more. You can choose to practice sex selection—or, as those at the conference would say, “family balancing.” You will not singlehandedly reinforce society’s devaluation of female-bodied people. You can choose to pay a premium for a Caucasian egg donor rather than an Indian one. You are not personally upholding systemic racism.
Indeed, slides presented at the conference routinely mentioned sex selection, screening for Down syndrome, and paying more for certain traits in “high demand” without even hinting that such practices might be problematic. In fact, the nonchalance with which they were referenced can only indicate that the speakers were confident their audience wouldn’t object. These practices are now a part of the myriad options open to the rational individual consumer, appropriate choices in the free market surrogacy agencies would like to pretend doesn’t exist.
On the surface, then, surrogacy is a journey that simply fulfills parents’ desires for children. But the interplay I witnessed between the “happy family” rhetoric and the many doses of caution reflect the complications bubbling beneath.
One of Dr. Harry Haiselden's refrains when defending his behavior in the Baby Bollinger case was that doctors everywhere routinely decided to let hopeless defectives die; he only wanted to illuminate the practice for the public. Yet, the doctor seemed to desire the spotlight not only for eugenic medicine but also for himself.
After the Baby Bollinger case entered the news, Haiselden was invited to speak at social clubs, improvement societies, and professional organizations. On November 29, 1915, not two weeks after the baby's death, he gave a speech about the case and "defective" children generally in between the second and third acts of a controversial race improvement play called “The Unborn.” In early December, he addressed the Chicago Physicians, Dentists, and Pharmacists Association, where he reaffirmed his actions in the Bollinger case and expressed his commitment to sterilization of the unfit, including all those who had been confined to an institution for the "feebleminded" for more than one year.
In an acknowledgement of Dr. Haiselden’s rising celebrity and a demonstration of the cultural reach of the Baby Bollinger case, the January 10, 1916, edition of the Los Angeles Times “Pen Points” column, consisting of a series of pithy observations by the staff, included the following: “Dr. Haiselden has been summoned to New York to study a ‘defective’ case and to be the guest of honor at the opening of a play. It looks as if in allowing the Bollinger baby case to become public the doctor was foolish like a fox”—meaning, not very foolish at all.
Haiselden's growing visibility intensified public discourse over the Baby Bollinger case. Biologists, doctors, eugenists, clergymen, lawyers, and lay persons wrote letters to the editor in droves, and newspapers began to solicit and publish compilations of these letters in long features under titles like “Was the Doctor Right?” and “Does Humanity Demand the Saving of Defective Babies?”
Letters in Support
Those who wrote in support of the doctor raised several common arguments. One major contention was that in deciding not to operate, Haiselden was merely acting as an objective agent of science. It was authoritative, factual science that decreed the baby should not live, and one cannot question the dictates of science. Others maintained that the autonomy of a doctor in caring for a patient is inviolable. No other person has the right to interfere in a doctor’s work.
Many more commentators took a direct eugenic approach: Haiselden did the right thing in limiting the number of parasitic “degenerates” who would pollute the national stock and drain public resources. All such babies should be put to death upon birth. After all (in a disturbingly distorted echo of Dr. John Dill Robertson's testimony before the coroner's jury), weak babies in ancient Sparta were unsentimentally exposed to the elements to die.
Some earnestly argued that if we can approve of sterilization of feebleminded individuals, then surely we can approve of the elimination of unfit babies. The well-known eugenist Irving Fisher wrote that the idea is only shocking because it is new. In time, he said, we will grow accustomed to such extreme preventive action. In a letter to the editor, Charles Davenport, the famous head of the Eugenics Record Office, described death as “one of Nature’s greatest racial blessings.”* A few supporters recalled neighbors or acquaintances with disabilities that they believed were prime candidates to receive this “blessing.”
With similar conclusions but a softer approach, some letter writers argued it would be a mercy to let babies with disabilities die rather than to allow them to experience a lifetime of “pain, shame, humiliation, and distress.” If we can be kind enough to put down injured or abnormal animals, they said, then certainly we can muster the same kindness for defective human babies.
Still others doubted that Baby Bollinger could have claimed the labels of "human" or "alive." As biologist Raymond Pearl wrote, "[T]his infant could never develop into anything even approaching a normal human being.” The editor of the London Lancet, one of the world's most prestigious medical journals, said, "I do not consider that the child ever really lived.”
A number of individuals tried to pinpoint the general conditions under which Haiselden’s measures would be acceptable. They distinguished between physically and mentally “defective” children. The former might still contribute something to society and should be permitted to live, but the latter are a useless drain, they said. An additional demarcation was that Dr. Haiselden hadn’t actually killed the baby; he had merely permitted nature to take its inevitable course. Since not operating was not a deliberate action but the absence of an action, he could not be blamed for "nature fulfill[ing] its own destiny." Death or life would be nature's decision. (They did not acknowledge that there is never more than one possible outcome for a baby left without basic care over the course of several days.)
Another common approach for supporters was to dodge the issue of the rightness of Haiselden’s actions. They expressed a lack of comfort with the idea that a single man, even if a doctor, could make the decision to withhold life from another individual, even though they agreed with the results. Some expressed disapproval of Dr. Haiselden for “making such a public ado about the matter.” Several opined that the treatment of the baby and babies like him was hardly worth discussing. Instead, the public should turn its attention to things that matter, like war or abortion.
An additional category of responses in affirmation were purportedly—though judging by their contents, rather doubtfully—sent from children with disabilities who with wide-eyed innocence lamented their unfortunate lives. Haiselden reported that he had received a letter from a young girl that read:
Just a line from a little crippled girl, thanking you for not letting that baby live. . . We can’t play like other children. We are in every one’s road but mother’s and her poor heart aches with ours. We are just a curiosity for people to gaze at. Tell Mrs. Bollinger she is a grand, good mother, and her baby is an angel in a beautiful place—heaven. Why do people want to keep me and that little baby out of heaven? I remain your little invalid, ready to go to heaven at any time.
The most sympathetic writers were mothers and fathers who loved their children with severe disabilities, but who struggled to take care of them and didn’t know where to turn for assistance. They felt that it might have been better for their children to have died at birth than to condemn them to abuse in asylums, or to spend their own lives in fear of what would happen to their children when they died. (Interestingly, Dr. Haiselden himself frequently spoke out against the terrible conditions in asylums and institutions for the care of persons with disabilities.)
But the most striking letters by far were written by other doctors who had the power to practice Haiselden's ideals. Dr. William Rausch, Jr. of Albany, New York wrote that in the cases of babies with severe inherited disability, he believed it was “humane to cut off their future suffering by one means or another, preferably ‘forgetting’ to tie the cord” so they would hemorrhage. Dr. David Monash of Northwestern University Medical School admitted to having done just that in a few cases. Dr. Charles Sumner Bacon of the University of Illinois took issue with Rausch’s recommendation, countering that he found that particular method of infanticide to be “unreliable.” He wrote, “The usual methods of killing a new-born are by smothering, strangulating, or dividing.”
Letters in Opposition
Letters in opposition to Haiselden’s actions also followed common themes, though newspapers published them less frequently. Although we do not know the exact proportion of viewpoints expressed in the letters submitted to the media, the Independent estimated that they had received four times as many letters supporting Haiselden than condemning him.
Many opponents argued that only God could give or take away life, so Haiselden was assuming a power to which he had no right. (Haiselden’s supporters tended to respond that God wouldn't mind too much.) Others referenced a different higher power—the courts—as the only earthly decider over life and death. They cited the fifth amendment of the Constitution: No one can be deprived of life, liberty, and property without due process of law. Certainly, a single doctor neither elected nor appointed had the authority to order life or death. Said noted social worker Jane Addams, “Under no circumstances has any human being the right to pass judgment of death for unfitness on any other human being. Only one thing will justify such presumption: the course of the law in punishing a murderer.”
Others focused on the duty of a doctor to treat the sick and prolong life, not end it. By not doing everything in his power to save the baby, Haiselden was violating the dictates of his profession. One letter said that doctors who are “eugenist-enthusiasts” should be forced to declare their beliefs and let patients decide whether to patron their services. Few would want to leave their health in the hands of a doctor who might believe they would be better off dead.
Some heralded great “defectives” of the past who had contributed much to society, naming Helen Keller, John Milton, Lord Byron, Robert Louis Stevenson, Fyodor Dostoevsky, Napoleon, Emperor Wilhelm, and ancient Greek orator Demosthenes as examples. These individuals overcame their challenges and developed “greater capacities in other respects.” Wrote P. Smith, “Who knows but what this babe—deformed and malformed as it is said to have been—might have possessed some gift that would have added a little mite to the world’s spiritual or intellectual heritage?” (For her part, Helen Keller submitted a letter to the New Republic in support of Haiselden, writing, “The toleration of such anomalies [as Baby Bollinger] tends to lessen the sacredness in which normal life is held.”)
A few letter-writers stated that they taught, treated, or worked with people with disabilities and found them equally deserving of life, rights, and benefits as individuals who did not have disabilities. Others said that regardless of the severity of an initial diagnosis, with treatment, patients might do better than was initially anticipated. In addition, new treatments and therapies were constantly being discovered that might help once-hopeless cases.
Many were concerned that the doctor’s actions would set a bad precedent for future cases. Though the Bollinger case may have appeared straightforward to some, where would we draw the line between fit and unfit, normal and subnormal? The possibility for abuse was enormous.
Doctors critical of Haiselden wrote that they had been trained to treat patients, relieve suffering, and extend life. They were not equipped to judge the worthiness of an infant’s continued existence, and had no desire to become executioners. Wrote Dr. James J. Walsh:
The physician has assumed the exercise of a power that is not his. Doctors have the care of life, not death. Physicians are educated to care for the health of their patients, but so far at least as I know we have no courses in our medical colleges as yet which teach how to judge when a patient’s life may be of no service to the community so as to let him or her die properly. Some of us physicians may thank God that we are not yet the licensed executioners of the unfit for the community, and some of us know how fallacious our judgments are even with regard to the few things we know.
The Black Stork
While public discussion eventually waned, Haiselden remained determined to share his beliefs with a broader audience. He co-wrote and starred as himself in a 1917 propaganda movie derived from the Bollinger case called The Black Stork. The Sheriott Pictures Corporation, which produced the film, frantically objected to the “propaganda” label, preferring the interpretation that the film was a "living document" intended to teach "moral cleanliness." Despite its stated aims, the moral authorities challenged the film because its subject matter was seen as risqué and threatened to revoke the license of any theater that showed it.
In the film, a mother gives birth to a baby that the doctor (played by Haiselden) labels as physically, mentally, and morally defective. The doctor suggests to the mother that she allow her baby to die, but the mother is unsure. She falls asleep and dreams about what would happen if the baby lived. The baby grows up to be a violent criminal who returns to the hospital and murders the doctor for allowing him to live a miserable life. The mother awakens and tells the doctor that she agrees to allow the child to pass away. The doctor looks on as the child’s soul leaves its body and enters the arms of an awaiting Jesus Christ.
The film was not well received. Variety reported, “Not in many moons has a feature film received such a panning in the Chicago dailies as was given ‘The Black Stork.’”
Chicago Daily Tribune movie critic Mae Tinée wrote of the “nauseating display”:
The production has not even the saving grace of being a good picture. It is amateurishly acted. . . and the photography is bad. It has no elements to attract either the thinking or the sensation seekers and is as pleasant to look at as a running store. Itself a hopeless defective, it should have been mercifully throttled at birth.
The Billboard said of the film in its review:
The Black Stork is a sickening excuse to drag before the camera all of the deteriorated humanity which the defective hospitals could pour into five reels. It is a gagging nauseating exposition of the results of uncurbed licentiousness, in a story told with a smear of science as a prop. It is not a sex-lure film; it is a mere cataloguing of the pitiable mess of human dregs which is left, crawling, crippled and criminal, after the fire has burned out.
While the film was widely mocked, Haiselden's ideas continued to have serious consequences. Only a couple of months after the film opened in theaters, the doctor contacted the media once more to announce that he planned to let another three “defective” babies die.
[To be concluded with Part 3.]
*It is worth noting that “race” in this context does not refer to the
racial categories as we consider them today, but to the “human race” or
even the “American race.”
A video clip of The Black Stork:
1. “The Black Stork.” Billboard, 29.7: 61. Feb. 17, 1917.
2. “Black Stork Feature.” Billboard, 29.16: 56, Apr. 21, 1917.
3. “Black Stork Panned.” Variety, 46.6: 28, Apr. 6, 1917.
4. “Crippled Girl Writes, Upholding Dr. Haiselden in Bollinger Case.” Washington Post, Nov. 23, 1915.
5. “Defeats Cardinal Farley: Injunction Permits Production of an Objectionable Play.” New York Times, Nov. 30, 1915.
6. “Defective Babe Dies as Decreed.” New York Times, Nov. 18, 1915.
7. “Does Humanity Demand the Saving of Defective Babies?” Chicago Daily Tribune, Nov. 17, 1915.
8. “Dr. Haiselden Praised by Bent and Crippled.” Chicago Daily Tribune, Nov. 22, 1915.
9. Keller, Helen. “Physicians’ Juries for Defective Babies,” New Republic, Dec. 18, 1915. Accessed via the Disability History Museum. http://www.disabilitymuseum.org/dhm/lib/detail.html?id=3209.
10. “Judge Scully Assails Dr. Harry J. Haiselden.” Chicago Daily Tribune, Jul. 28, 1916.
11. “Many Defectives Included Among World’s Greatest Men and Women.” Washington Post, Nov. 18, 1915.
12. “Most Doctors Let a Defective Live.” New York Times, Nov. 21, 1915.
13. “Moving Pictures: Comm. Bell Bans Three.” Variety, 48.6: 16, Apr. 20, 1917.
14. “Pen Points.” Los Angeles Times, Jan. 10, 1916.
15. “Right and Wrong in the Case of the Baby Who Was Allowed to Die.” Current Opinion, Vol. L, No. 1, Jan. 1916.
16. “Surgeon Lets Little Child Die When Knife Could Have Saved It.” Washington Post, Nov. 18, 1915.
17. Tinée, Mae. “It Is Cheap, Sickening, Unnecessary: ‘The Black Stork.’” Chicago Daily Tribune, Apr. 2, 1917.
18. “Was the Doctor Right?: Some Independent Opinions.” Independent . . . Devoted to the Consideration of Politics, Social and Economic Tendencies, 85.350: 23, Jan. 3, 1916.
Another week, a fresh slew of CRISPR gene editing news and developments.
On September 24 Thomson Reuters predicted that Jennifer Doudna and Emmanuelle Charpentier would earn a Nobel Prize in chemistry for their widely celebrated 2012 research on the gene editing complex, CRISPR and associated protein Cas9. We could know as early as October 7 whether the Nobel committee will cut the wait time between publishing and laurels for a chemistry award from its 20-year average since 1985 to just three years.
The same day that the annual Nobel predictions hit the wire, Doudna, Charpentier, and a number of other researchers were gathered at Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory (CSHL) in New York for the first day of a conference called Genome Engineering: The CRISPR/Cas Revolution. That evening, Charpentier co-chaired a session with Feng Zhang, a co-discoverer of CRISPR’s gene editing capabilities and currently a rival of Charpentier’s and Doudna’s in a patent fight about the discovery. When Zhang took the stage after Charpentier, he pivoted away from CRISPR-Cas9 and, in the words of one participant, “blew us all out of the water.”
Zhang’s talk described a new CRISPR discovery that would be published the next day in Cell: an alternative CRISPR-associated protein called Cpf1. According to a Broad Institute press release,
“Zhang and his collaborators searched through hundreds of CRISPR systems in different types of bacteria, searching for enzymes with useful properties that could be engineered for use in human cells.”
The statement goes on to quote Broad Director Eric Lander asserting that the “Cpf1 system represents a new generation of genome editing technology…with the potential for even simpler and more precise genome engineering.”
Nature’s and Science’s headlines echoed this assessment, celebrating the discovery as an improvement on Cas9 and a sharper pair of molecular scissors, respectively.
But coverage in MIT Technology Review included some additional views. Science writer Antonio Regalado quotes University of Minnesota researcher Dan Boytas, who notes that the “greatest value may be more in terms of the patent landscape than a scientific advancement,” and George Church, who describes a coming “niche market for a collection of different proteins so that cuts can be placed anywhere in the genome.” Regalado also reports that researchers outside the Cpf1 research team “said the new system was likely to fill a limited role in what is a growing toolbox of DNA-editing techniques.”
Writing in Wired—a publication not averse to CRISPR hype—Sarah Zhang reinforced the idea that Cpf1 is not a Cas9 “rival so much as a complementary tool,” not so much an improvement as a method with slightly different capabilities. Wired quotes Feng Zhang’s research colleague John van der Oost: “We have the feeling it’s just the tip of the iceberg.” Doudna herself, in an October 1 interview on the Nobel Prize rumors, said that the research “underscores the wonderful diversity of these CRISPR systems” but that it was “unclear” whether Cpf1 will be “useful for genome editing.”
So for some, Cpf1 signals CRISPR 2.0, a “better way to edit the genome” or an “outsnip” of CRISPR/Cas9 potentially undercutting Doudna and Charpentier’s predicted grasp on a #NobelPrize. A different take is that we are still in the earliest stages of understanding the scientific, let alone the social, legal, and ethical, implications of CRISPR genome editing.
Officially co-hosting will be the Chinese Academy of Sciences and the UK Royal Society. No other European organization is included as a partner, despite (or perhaps because of) the region’s explicit policies on human germline modification as set forth by the Council of Europe’s Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, which proscribes it.
A German scientist is, however, a member of the planning committee. The UK and China each have two representatives on the committee.
The explicit goal of the "international summit" is "to discuss the scientific, medical, ethical, and governance issues associated with human gene-editing research." Though the meeting is only ten weeks away, the details of the agenda and the invited speakers have not been announced. CGS’s Marcy Darnovsky has been invited to speak, and has accepted.
It is perhaps interesting that the word "medical" has been added to the list of issues since the original announcement. It's not inappropriate, but the addition would seem to skew the discussion in the direction of implementation. Also, what will be the scope of the "ethical issues" discussed? Worryingly, a recent Institute of Medicine committee considering a related technique seemed to limit them to narrowly defined research ethics, and not to consider broader social issues.
Naturally, people with varying views are staking out positions and trying to persuade others. George Church is campaigning in New Scientist; and others on all sides of the issue are, quite rightly, putting their views forward.
On September 1, the Wellcome Trust, Medical Research Council, and three other leading British research organizations put out a statement supporting preclinical use of gene editing in human embryos and affirming
that there may be future potential to apply genome editing in a clinical context using human germ cells or embryos, though this is prohibited by law in the UK and unlikely to be permissible in other European jurisdictions at present.
Then the Hinxton Group, an international consortium of stem cell researchers, essentially agreed. Its statement stressed [pdf] that
Policymakers should refrain from constraining scientific inquiry unless there is substantial justification for doing so that reaches beyond disagreements based solely on divergent moral convictions.
Critics called this increasing the pressure for genetically modified embryos. It certainly seems close to "get out of the way."
So far, so normal in the politics of science. But the next step was
unusual: Kathy Niakan, a researcher at the Francis Crick Institute in London, applied to the UK
authorities for a license to edit the genes of human embryos.
not sure the case has been made that you need to go and study human
embryos right now. It does seem to me that before you make the case that
you want to try this in human embryos, you ought to explain why you
don't need to do more animal work with this brand-new technology.
going to be true for quite a while yet. So with the discussion of germline gene editing just getting underway, why the rush?
Robin Lovell-Badge, one of the two British representatives on the National Academies' summit organizing committee, seems to have been involved in all three of these efforts. He's Naikan's boss, and advocate in the press; he's on the steering committee of the group that drafted the Hinxton statement; and his connections with the Wellcome Trust are long-standing and deep. Certainly all three initiatives match his opinion, expressed in April, that:
I disagree with such a moratorium [on embryo editing], which is in any case unlikely to be
effective. I am fully supportive of research being carried out on early
human embryos in vitro…The arguments become even more contentious when
dealing with 'enhancement'. However, while we work towards using the
methods to make disease-resistant crops and animals, should we deny this
possibility for humans?
He is of course entitled to express that opinion, as he surely will in December. But does it begin to look as though there is
an effort to put a thumb on the scale?